

Title	Rules and Negotiations: Livestock Ownership among the Turkana in Northwestern Kenya
Author(s)	OHTA, Itaru
Citation	African Study Monographs (2019), 40(2-3): 109-131
Issue Date	2019-10
URL	<a href="https://doi.org/10.14989/244853">https://doi.org/10.14989/244853</a>
Right	Copyright by The Center for African Area Studies, Kyoto University, October 1, 2019.
Type	Journal Article
Textversion	publisher

## RULES AND NEGOTIATIONS: LIVESTOCK OWNERSHIP AMONG THE TURKANA IN NORTHWESTERN KENYA

Itaru OHTA

*The Center for African Area Studies, Kyoto University*

**ABSTRACT** This paper examines how the Turkana follow (and do not follow) rules and norms in negotiations about their livestock entitlements. Previous studies on livestock ownership in African pastoral societies tended to concentrate on the ideological and legal levels of property relations, namely, norms, rules and institutions. Although these rules and norms indicate what actions are appropriate and desirable, people do not necessarily follow the rules and norms unconditionally, because they are effective only in specific contexts. The metaphor of “bundle of rights” has been utilized in the literature to describe how people have overlapping, complicated and multiple rights in livestock. However, the “bundle of rights” has been examined only on the ideological and normative levels. This paper demonstrates how the Turkana tenaciously negotiate in daily practice to persuade others of their legitimate entitlement to livestock. Rules and norms are only evoked to assert the logic and explanation in these negotiations. Likewise, the “bundle of rights” does not exist as a tangible, unchanging entity. It always emerges “performatively” in the process of a negotiation at a specific time and place. This author advocates the position that it is essential to thoroughly scrutinize the Turkana daily practice of negotiations in order to understand livestock property rights in the Turkana and other African pastoral societies.

**Key Words:** Property relation; Property right; Bundle of rights; Daily practice; Norm.

### INTRODUCTION

Living among the Turkana, one gets a strange feeling of not knowing whether one’s own things really belong to oneself. My clothes, cap, wristwatch that I wore, the pots and tableware for daily use, the food kept in my hut, and other possessions are all “owned by me,” which usually should be self-evident. And yet, I was often not sure, as if my surroundings were only a farce, and maybe the things that were “owned by me” did not exist at all. When such a doubt arose, I felt as if material things started to leach out of their outline as well as lose reality, seemingly so ethereal, that I had vertigo, unsure of whether I was truly in this world or was having a dream.

I will try to elaborate with an example. The Turkana people come to me to ask many things from me. In doing so, their demeanor is absolutely proud and heavy-handed, as if to say, “I am completely entitled to demand this from you.” This seemed quite coercive to the Japanese sensitivity. The Turkana would strongly demand to have things from me saying, “Why don’t you give me this? Am I a mere stranger to you?” The common sensical argument, that I am free to decide what I do with “my things,” does not go a long way (Ohta, 1986). I felt only irritation quite a few times in such situations. Itani (1982: 230) who researched

the same Turkana society later wrote that he “could not, to this day, understand the true nature of their relentless and never-ending begging.” Gulliver (1951: 8–9) also wrote, “my wife and I were continually pestered for all we had” while they conducted fieldwork, and “you must ask, nay demand, or else you will get nothing” among the Turkana.

However, the longer I lived among the Turkana people, my feelings changed over time. This was partially due to my being able to retort, “I don’t have any!” even at times it was not true, as I learned to act in the Turkana way. It may have been a crude way for refusing a demand, but I had learned to say no. At the same time, I experienced myself demanding things from my Turkana friends, and at times, was given things where I was enticed into requesting by the owners! I started to suspect that there surely was an entitlement when the Turkana demanded my things or handled them as if they were theirs. Simply put, I had become accustomed to the Turkana way of life. However, here I need to point out that the helpless ambiguity that I described above, as to not knowing the reality of whether or not I really owned my things, came to me not before my acculturation, but after it.

A simple explanation for the situation, “My things do not belong to me,” may be to say that in a society based on so-called “communal principles” such as the Turkana, the norm is to mutually share everything, and nothing may come under anyone’s exclusive entitlement. However, to state that, “In the so-and-so society, they behave this way because it is the norm,” is only convenient determinism, emphasizing the difference among cultures. I was more than aware of such determinism from the beginning of my research living among the Turkana. I also knew that the argument was not at all effective in explaining the feeling of helpless ambiguity that I repeatedly felt.

Generally, social norms define the appropriate behavioral patterns of the members of a particular group, and clarify the values to be achieved. At the same time, these norms (or rules) are utilized by the people to negotiate and fortify their demands, as Comaroff & Roberts (1981) demonstrated. Social norms and rules could simultaneously be adhered to and at the same time, be subject to negotiation. In this sense, norms and rules are not at all absolute and exogenous to an individual, nor unequivocally definitive of behaviors that are “correct anywhere, anytime” (Ohta, 2001).

The Turkana are pastoralists living in the arid area of northwest Kenya. They keep five kinds of livestock: cattle, camel, goat, sheep, and donkey. Livestock is highly valued, and the Turkana collective noun for the above-mentioned livestock, *ngi-bar-en* (sing. *e-bar-asit*), is also translated as wealth. The Turkana verb, *aki-bar* which has the same stem, means “to multiply one’s livestock = to become rich,” and a noun, *eka-bar-an* (pl. *ngika-bar-ak*), signifies “the rich in livestock = a wealthy person.” I will not describe in detail here the importance of livestock among the Turkana, but a man without any livestock cannot marry, start a family, maintain social relationships with friends, nor hold rituals to cure ailments. In other words, not only is livestock necessary to maintain a livelihood, it is also wealth of utmost importance in every facet of life, including social relations and

religion. The Turkana people are keenly interested in their livestock, and it is a source of conflicts of interest and emotional discords. This serves as the backdrop to the people's social practice pertaining to livestock. Livestock ownership and entitlement, and the corollary issues, are central to the Turkana.

In the following pages, I elucidate how the Turkana follow (or do not follow) the norms that relate to the giving and receiving of things. For this, I describe their norms and daily practices pertaining to property relations of livestock.

## PREVIOUS STUDIES ON PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PASTORAL SOCIETIES

### I. Multiple Property Rights in Livestock

Kazanov & Schlee (2012: 7) in the introduction of *Who Owns the Stock? Collective and Multiple Property Rights in Animals* wrote that, the “most complicated, multiple and overlapping rights in stocks are characteristic of African pastoralists.” They classified livestock property rights into the following five basic types:

- (1) Full rights of ownership, which imply the ultimate right of allocation, disposal and sale of animals.
- (2) Nominal rights of ownership, where rights of control or even of disposal belong to another person.
- (3) Shared ownership (co-ownership, joint ownership) implies different degrees of rights and even a different percentage of ownership in individual animals.
- (4) Usufruct rights, such as milking or transportation, which in many cases are merely of a temporary order.
- (5) The rights in the offspring or a defined part of the offspring of an animal. Often calves are promised to hired shepherds for their services.

Kazanov & Schlee (2012) devoted five articles on African societies, all of which described and analysed complicated livestock rights. According to Pelican (2012: 219), among the Fulbe (Mbororo) in northwestern Cameroon, sons were given livestock from their fathers, but the son had only “nominal ownership.” The son “cannot legitimately make use of his ownership rights,” before his father agrees that the son may build his own family based on his independent herd. Before this, the father has “the ultimate rights of allocation and alienation” of livestock. He may even sell his son's animal. And although the father is “morally required to at least inform the latter and replace the animal as soon as possible, this obligation is often overlooked.” Women have “usufruct rights” to their own animals, but “the final right” lies with the household head. Schlee (2012: 260) also wrote that pastoral people had “shared rights” in an animal. For example, when an animal is given as a loan, both the holder and the owner have their own rights in the “shared” animal.

Although classifying the multiple rights that pertain to livestock into several categories seems useful in making the complicated livestock ownership more under-

standable, this has a significant drawback in that it is easy to wrongly construe these rights as definite and legal. Pastoral people may declare, “I have full rights of ownership of this animal,” or “My wife has rights to utilize milk of this cow.” However, because these people do not have rules as codified law, such as ours, it is not always clear whether these statements imply rigid rules, or refer to moral requirements, or are mere descriptions of actual practice. There exist norms that are ethical, such as that, “Those living together must all share ample milk to drink, especially with the children when there is shortage.” There are also value-neutral rules, such as that, “An offspring of my livestock is mine.” Some norms may have a directly associated sanction in case of violation, but there are many others that do not.

## II. Four Layers of Property Relations

Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006: 15) proposed that property should be analysed in the four layers:

- (1) Cultural ideals and ideologies,
- (2) Legal institutions,
- (3) Actual social relationships, and
- (4) Social practices.

Although what happens in each layer is closely related to the other layers, “They concern different kinds of social phenomena, just as marriage ideologies and legal rules about marriage are different from the actual relations between two married people and their daily interactions.”

Among the African pastoral societies, the above-mentioned first and second layers of ideologies and legal institutions are not significantly distinguishable. People have mutual consent in that there are proper ways of obtaining, utilizing and disposing livestock. Such consent may be called cultural ideology, belief, norm or rule, but because local rules and norms are not in the statutory form, it is difficult to discern ideologies and law.

Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006: 16) wrote that the second layer of legal institutions provided a legitimate scheme for property relationships, where property relationships were “categorical,” because property holders, property objects, and rights and obligations attached to these were specific legal-institutional categories. It is evident that the Kazanov & Schlee (2012)’s classification of various rights to livestock into five basic types (categories) matches this layer.

Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006: 25) also lamented that many studies on property relationships failed to distinguish between the second (legal) and third (social relations) layers. At the third, social relations layer, property relationships are more “concretised” (Benda-Beckmann et al., 2006: 19), so that we may explore actual social relationships between property-right holders and certain valuables. Among the pastoral societies, property rights might be expressed in such a way as: “I am the owner of this camel,” or “I utilize the milk of this cow,” etc. These rights often become subject to negotiation, because people sometimes demand their own rights referring to diverse normative legitimations. People make various claims

and counterclaims on the contested livestock. Moreover, because people have many other social ties, such as kinship relations, wider social networks should also be taken into account in understanding the actual property relationships.

At the fourth, social practice layer, people use, transfer, and inherit property, or dispute the property rights. People might also discuss the appropriateness of property rules, and rules and laws might be reproduced and changed in due course. These social practices will cause changes in the first, second and third layers of property relationships, which shows that these four layers are closely interrelated (Benda-Beckmann et al., 2006).

As I pointed out, previous research on property relationships of livestock in African pastoral societies have mainly focused on the second, legal-institutional layer. However, these studies contain many ethnographic descriptions of the third (social relations) and fourth (social practice) layers. For example, Schlee (2012: 263) wrote in referring to Spencer's (1973) research that livestock ownership was always contested and negotiated among the Samburu. A Samburu bridegroom must transfer eight cattle as bridewealth, but after marriage, the family members of the bride continue to demand gifts from the bridegroom and his patrilineal family members on various occasions. If the bride's kin feel that their claims are not met reasonably, they may place a curse on the other party. Also, a Samburu man is not free to sell away his own livestock, because there is a moral obligation for the members of the same clan to assist each other in livestock transactions (Spencer, 1973 in Schlee, 2012: 263).

Dahl (1987: 260) explored women's status and roles in pastoral societies. She proposed to classify property rights on livestock into the following three categories:

- (1) "jural" rights to make final decisions of livestock disposal,
- (2) "allotted rights" when specific animals are promised to be given in future, at the time of inheritance or re-distribution, and
- (3) delegated rights to allocate and utilize livestock products.

She emphasized that although ideologies and cultural models in pastoral societies granted much authority to men whereas women were to be obedient to the men in behavioral norms, these norms belonged only to the sphere of idea and ideologies. She found that wives sometimes resisted suggestions from their husbands and stuck to their convictions. The women's informal influence played important roles in managing livestock herds and building/maintaining social relations. Dahl (1987)'s work also points out the importance of paying attention to the third (social relations) and fourth (social practice) layers of property relationships above.

### III. "Bundle of Rights"

When several persons have overlapping rights in an animal, their relationships may be analysed by utilizing the metaphor of "bundle of rights." Baxter (1975: 212) coined the term, "mobile" bundle of rights in the study of African pastoral societies. Pelican (2012: 213) also pointed out that the property rights are under-

stood as a bundle of rights.

Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006) wrote that “bundle of rights metaphor” was effective in examining the property relationships in the second (social relations) and third (social practice) layers of analysis mentioned above. For example, a man may be the owner of a specific farm, but he may have conferred the right of its management to another person. The latter may have leased the farm to a tenant, who may have a share-cropping arrangement with several other persons. In this case, “sub-bundles” of property rights are widely borne among different actors and constitute the “bundle of rights” of the farm.

In this example, each actor’s property right in our society may be clearly defined, because each right is exclusively specified by the relevant laws. However, the same does not apply unconditionally in other societies, because people engage in variegated negotiations that each corresponds to a specific social context. As Benda-Beckmann et al. (2006) maintained, these negotiations occur in the third (social relations) layer of property relations, and they profoundly influence the emergence of the “bundle of rights” at each specific time.

Max Gluckman (1965a; 1965b) also utilized this metaphor of “a bundle (cluster) of rights” in social anthropology. He argued that all property relations were ultimately social and political, and rejected the commonplace view in which property was conceived in terms of the relationship of persons to things. A person’s right over a specific property is better understood by examining his/her relationships with other persons. Gluckman (1965a: 36) wrote, “what is owned in fact is a claim to have power to do certain things with the land or property, to possess immunities against the encroachment of others on one’s rights in them, and to exercise certain privileges in respect of them.” Then, “*ownership cannot be absolute*, for the critical thing about property is the role that it plays in a nexus of specific relationships” (1965b: 45, italics for emphasis).

The “bundle of rights” does not exist as a tangible, unchanging entity. It always emerges “performatively”<sup>(1)</sup> in the process of a negotiation at a specific time and place, and it undergoes metamorphosis as members and their social relationships change among the parties concerned. In the following pages, I will demonstrate this point as seen in the process of negotiations by the Turkana over livestock ownership and usage.

#### IV. Turkana Statements

The Turkana frequently say, “Things are like this,” “Things should be done like this,” or “One ought to do this,” when they talk about livestock ownership. These remarks belong to the first (cultural ideals and ideologies) and second (legal institutions) layers of property relations (Benda-Beckman et al., 2006). However, because the Turkana do not have codified laws, it is insignificant to distinguish the two layers. The above remarks may be rules, norms and moral requirements, but I am not concerned with the distinctions of these remarks, and I will call them the Turkana Statements in the following sections of this article. Some of the Turkana Statements on property relations, such as, “An offspring of my livestock is mine,”



are rarely uttered in daily life because it is a matter of course for them. Such Turkana Statements that are not uttered directly by the Turkana are nonetheless important, and will include my interpretation as well.

## “IDENTIFICATION” WITH AN ANIMAL AT THE ONSET OF LIVESTOCK TRANSFER AND PROPERTY RIGHTS OF ADOLESCENT BOYS

### I. Giving and Receiving Livestock through “Identification”

The Turkana castrate most of the male animals, leaving a few uncastrated for breeding. The Turkana men each choose an ox and nurture a special relationship with it. They modify the shape of the horns to their liking, decorate the body with necklaces, bells, and branding patterns. They also compose and sing songs about their ox, in which they refer to them using various metaphors. These songs are one of the most important venues for the Turkana aesthetic inspiration.

The Turkana possess quite a rich vocabulary for the livestock coat color-patterns and horn shapes (Ohta, 1987; Dioli, 2018). They use this colorful vocabulary, and a man is referred to as the “father of such and such ox.” In this way, one certain ox becomes the most important and special partner animal for the individual Turkana man. Castrated goats and camels are also identified and chosen as the special animal by the men. The Turkana verb, *aki-dwar*, means to keep a specific bonding relationship with a castrated animal.

This special relationship is called “identification” in social anthropology, and this custom with all its variations exists widely among the East African pastoral societies. The identified, special partner animal is alternatively called the favorite-ox, name-ox, dance-ox, song-ox, etc. The reason as to why the chosen animal is a castrated one has been the subject of much sociological and psychological discussion (e.g. Beidelman, 1966).

The reason I touch upon this custom is because identification is among the motivations for giving and receiving livestock for the Turkana.

#### [Turkana Statement 1]

The Turkana men ask for a specific animal among the livestock owned by others, with the reason, “The animal has my own color-pattern,” and indeed are given the animal they want.

The expression, “The animal has my own color-pattern,” needs to be explained here. All Turkana men choose a specific livestock coat color as their own, and establish a special partner relationship with the animal of just the right coat color. However, each animal with such special bonding inevitably will grow much faster than each man, to grow old and die one day. Then another animal of the same coat color will be chosen, then another, again and again. Also, the Turkana man may “identify” not necessarily with one individual animal at a time, but rather, with a few, and all the animals have the same coat color.



A Turkana boy of about five years of age will start to make and sing songs about a special partner ox of his own. In reality, the song is usually dedicated to a male newborn whose mother animal is either milked by the boy's mother or the boy himself. When the boy becomes about ten years old, he may begin to own his partner animal of his chosen coat color, usually given to him by his close kin. He will then put necklaces and other ornaments on the animal, and sing songs about it in public.

## II. Ownership as a Violable Right which Needs to Be Defended

However, this identification with an animal and the resultant ownership is sooner or later violated. After a boy starts his ownership of a special animal, it will grow with the boy, then be eaten by the family, exchanged with another animal, or sold off. The boy's wish to keep his special animal is thus easily overridden.

### Case 1 (27 December 1980)

The main characters and their relationships are: Kakuma, the homestead elder; Lokangai, the widow of Kakuma's elder brother, who shares a homestead with Kakuma; Lopur, Lokangai's first son about 15 years old; and castrated goats X, Y and Z. On this day, Kakuma slaughtered Z to be eaten by the homestead members. After the slaughter, I overheard quite an animated exchange from the direction of Lokangai's hut. Lopur was shouting at his mother. The episode went as follows.

Lopur had "identified" with castrated goats X, Y and Z. He had thought of all three as his own. About one year ago, he had an agreement with Kakuma to exchange two of his castrated goats for an uncastrated young bull. At that point, Kakuma gained X and butchered it. The other castrated goat to be taken by Kakuma was not specified on the spot, but the agreement was to be made soon afterward. In other words, Lopur (or his mother Lokangai) owed Kakuma one castrated goat. Such an incomplete exchange often occurred between persons in a close relationship.

About three months after the agreement, Lokangai slaughtered Y for consumption. Lopur believed that Y was taken as part of the original exchange promised with Kakuma. But this was not the case, and on this day Z was given to Kakuma to clear Lopur's debt, and slaughtered.

Lopur was overheard shouting at his mother, "You killed Y without asking me first, but I accepted it because I thought it was the animal owed to Kakuma. I am not going to take this, if it was slaughtered just to be eaten by you. You ate Y without my permission. I demand that you repay me for Y." To this, Lokangai retorted, "Some time ago, you broke one leg of my nanny goat while herding by throwing a stick at it. The animal died because of the broken leg. You repay me for that!" People who happen to be around imitated Lopur's wailing and shouting, and laughed and laughed. Eventually Lopur himself started to laugh, and the quarrel did not become any more serious.

That night, I had Lokangai explain the incident. She said, "I was hungry, so

I ate Y. There is no reason a mother has to repay for eating her son's goat!" She admitted that Y was "identified" by her son. She also admitted that she discussed with the homestead elder, Kakuma, about eating Y, and that she did not talk with her son, because he was not yet grown up. People who had gathered around also emphasized to me that, "Lopur is not grown up."

This incident shows that a boy's "ownership" of an identified partner animal is at times easily ignored. That Lopur said he "thought" that Y was the animal owed to Kakuma, meaning that he did not know the real reason why he lost Y, goes against the Turkana way of thinking. I believe that he argued in such a way because the special animal was slaughtered against his wishes, and he needed to express his emotion that he was wronged. However, the boy's resistance was to no avail.

There was another incident where another family was about to butcher a castrated goat for a ritual, and the family head, about 30 years of age, asked his younger brother who was about Lopur's age to give up his special partner animal. I happened to be at the scene, and saw the younger brother adamantly refused the request. The ritual had to do with the whole family and not of personal interest to the elder brother. However, the younger brother refused to give up his goat, saying that it was his one and only special partner animal. Finally, the elder brother respected the wishes of his brother and slaughtered another goat for the occasion.

Why was the second boy's resistance ultimately successful in contrast to Lopur's situation in Case 1? Here I will not speculate on the difference in the background situations, but it is apparent that a boy must reasonably argue well to defend his ownership of a special animal. It was pertinent that he could persuade the people around him, and this point cannot be over-emphasized.

## THE MATURING SON AND CONFLICT ABOUT LIVESTOCK

### I. A Mother's Livestock Is the Son's as Well: The Son Takes Action

I have shown that a boy's ownership of livestock is easily negated, but the boy will more strongly defend his wishes as he grows up. To describe this process, I also explain how livestock is "owned" in a Turkana family. A family has several levels of closeness in kinship ties (Gulliver, 1955). Here I will call a "family," the group members who share a patrilineal tie and together manage their livestock herds.

[Turkana Statement 2]

All the livestock of a family belong to the family head.

[Turkana Statement 3]

Most of the family herd is allocated to the wives of the family head.

Looking at a livestock herd, if one asks, "Who owns these animals?" the Turkana people will reply first with the name of the family head, usually an elderly male. However, livestock basically "belongs" to the wife. If there is more than one wife, the livestock is distributed among the wives. A son inherits his mother's livestock. This is to say, roughly speaking, a mother's livestock is also the son's, and the reverse is true as well. I was fortunate to witness how the relationship between mother and son in Case 1 changed over the years as the son grew up. The next episode took place eight years later, symbolizing the change in mother-and-son relationship.

#### Case 2 (11 September 1988)

About 2 o'clock in the afternoon, I overheard Lokangai's shrill cry in disbelief, "What has this come to!?" I overheard the voice first near Lokangai's hut, then heard it farther and farther away, and finally out of the homestead. I asked the people around me what had happened. They said that her son, Lopur, slaughtered a nanny goat he was grazing in order to entertain the mother's brother of his lover and eat its meat. The nanny goat that Lopur slaughtered had been given to Lokangai as her share of bridewealth when her daughter (Lopur's sister) married. It belonged to Lokangai, but Lopur slaughtered this animal without telling his mother. Lokangai returned to the village after about thirty minutes. She kept wailing as if she did not know whom to direct her frustration. She even started to say, "I am going to eat Lopur's special he-goat!" to which everyone tried to persuade her not to.

This incident was soon forgotten, seemingly without any lingering ill feeling. However, I think it was a special incident that showed a gravely altered mother-and-son relationship. I had observed the way the family utilized its livestock from 1980, and knew that this was the first time Lopur had killed an animal without his mother's consent.

### II. Continuous Conflict between Mother and Son: Gradual Accretion of a Maturing Son's Claim

The above episode signifies the fact that Lopur's social relations expanded to outside his immediate family. He had gained a lover, and for the Turkana youth in this situation, he must be always on guard to avoid getting into violent conflicts with his lover's family members, at the least, but the lover's kin would also come to demand many things from him. In 1991, Lopur killed another goat for the lover, then another for one of her kin.

Adolescence also coincides with the youth being demanded of things by the neighborhood elders and youths roughly of the same age. He will be repeatedly demanded to let them eat one of his goats. To meet these demands, Lopur killed at least nine goats between 1989 and 1992. A Turkana youth not only has to offer goats to these people, but he himself must go and demand livestock from kin and friends, because only through these negotiations, can a youth expand his social

horizons.

Around this same period, a youth will start to be recognized as an “owner” of livestock. In my research, I took pictures of livestock, one by one, owned by Lokangai and Lopur, and pasted them onto individual filing cards. When Turkana villagers visited me, they enjoyed fumbling through and sorting the cards over a conversation, saying, “This goat belongs to Lokangai. It was given to her from so and so.” In such conversations, all the livestock of Lokangai (and Lopur) were mentioned as Lokangai’s before 1982, and only one “identified” animal was Lopur’s. By 1988, however, the villagers that visited me referred to all these livestock as belonging to Lopur.

A youth gradually gains many entitlements to the livestock that his mother owns. There is no clear demarcation of when the mother gives up her formerly strong ownership or her say over the animals. It is also true that the interest of the mother and son do not always match. Lokangai became a widow in the late 1960s and managed livestock by herself. From her standpoint, she owned the nanny goat killed by her son, Lopur, in Case 2, as she had gained it as bridewealth of her daughter. Her livestock was to have increased as the nanny goat reproduced, so that in her mind, it was not right for her son to kill that animal. To her, Lopur could have killed his own castrated goat or asked his friends to give him a goat for the occasion. When Lokangai threatened Lopur “to eat his special he-goat,” it amounted to saying, “Only the animals Lopur ‘identified’ with were his entitlement and no other. All else are mine.” In other words, Lokangai would not give up her entitlement. It was foreseeable that the mother and son would continue to have such conflicts as to who can do what with the livestock. Each would have to persuade the other as to the entitlement each time.

## LIVESTOCK ENTITLEMENT DOES NOT BELONG TO AN INDIVIDUAL, AND NEGOTIATION ENSUES

### I. Livestock Shall Belong to the Wife, and the Husband Cannot Dispense It Freely

While livestock is a potential source of conflict and tension between a mother and son, similar issues arise between a husband and wife, as well as a father and son. I must first explain the Turkana relationship among co-wives, and revisit the Turkana Statements 2 and 3: All the livestock owned by a family nominally belong to the family head, while they actually belong to his wives in daily practice. This rule is easily understood if one understands the following.

There is frequent giving and receiving of livestock among Turkana friends and kin. Here we assume that a friend of the husband gives him one animal. When the former owner comes to visit, who else offers a warm welcome to him/her, but the wife? Then, if the recently acquired livestock does not belong to a specific wife, no one is sure who should show hospitality to the generous gift-giver. Especially when there are co-wives, the ambiguity is insurmountable, but to avoid this uncertainty, each wife will do her best to assume the ownership of a gift ani-

mal that the husband gained, which means that she will share the entitlement/obligation that arises from the acquisition of the animal.

In reality, social relationships are even more complex. The friend, the husband, and his co-wives, have reciprocal relationships each built upon a long history of successive giving-and-taking, and it may happen that all the co-wives rush to welcome the visiting friend with fresh livestock milk. Even so, the ownership of the newly acquired livestock will not stay in limbo for long. This is because when a wife milks, slaughters, or sells livestock for cash, she utilizes her own livestock, and the affiliation of the crux of a wife's daily living cannot rest unsettled for long.

Below is a case that convinced me personally that livestock belonged to the wives.

### Case 3 (21 December 1982)

One day, when I returned from a 4-day walking trip, I slaughtered one castrated goat for meat in order to express my gratitude to the villagers who accompanied me. A friend had given me the goat and I had entrusted it to the family that I stayed with.

The next day, the first wife of my host family came to visit, sat down next to me and started to complain. She said, "You are so different these days. You don't talk to me, nor give me things as you used to. You only give me the same amount of tobacco as you give anybody else."

I did not understand why she said these things all of a sudden. I told her that nothing between she and I had changed. She repeated the same comments for a while, and then brought up the subject of the goat I slaughtered the day before. She said, "It is not bad that you slaughter a goat when there are visitors or when you are hungry, but you must first consult me. If you did, I could have told you to slaughter another animal, and given you one of my own. It is not good that you decide all by yourself."

I suddenly understood. This woman had made sure to care for all the livestock that I bought or was given. When I acquired a nanny goat, she had asked me, "Who will milk this goat in future? Is it all right it is me?" as if she needed much assurance. There were other adult women in the host family, and what she wanted was to create a relationship with me where all my livestock "belonged" to her, and not to other women. Once such a relationship is made, neither party was to dispose of the livestock freely.

Such entitlement sharing involves all members of a family, with different degrees of entitlement from member to member. The next statement signifies the Turkana thinking that all the members of a family are inseparable as to livestock entitlement.

### [Turkana Statement 4]

All livestock acquired outside of the family must first be brought home to the livestock enclosure.

If a man receives an animal from a friend and sells it before reaching home without consulting anyone, the fact that he had newly acquired livestock would disappear, as it were. From the standpoint of his family members, they had been denied whatever entitlement that could have arisen. Had the husband brought home the animal, they would all have gained entitlement, be it to eat the meat of the animal, or to acquiesce to it being given away to a friend. The latter is an entitlement, as the friend will owe the family members a new acquisition of an animal. It also follows that no family member is responsible for the livestock that they did not know of in the first place. So, if the animal is sold away before it is taken home, the fact that a friend gave an animal to the man would not have made any social meaning. In other words, livestock entitlement unifies the members of a family as well as the society.

## II. The Husband Has Discretion, but Wives Resist It

There are some situations where the husband's discretion is recognized in dealing with the livestock without first consulting the wife.

### [Turkana Statement 5]

When the husband gives away livestock that are called *ngibaren a akib* (livestock of *akib*)<sup>(2)</sup> he does not need to tell the wife beforehand. *Akib* livestock are all goats and sheep. In contrast, there are livestock called *ngibaren a awi*, where *awi* denotes the family. These animals are not under the husband's discretion.

In practice, the matter is not so simple. The husband cannot freely do as he pleases with the *akib* livestock, even if he need not tell the wife beforehand. The following episode illustrates the complexity of the rule.

### Case 4 (23 November 1980)

There was a time when I often bought the locally caught wild francolins (several species of wild bird which belong to the genus *Francolinus*) from the villagers, and quite enjoyed them for supper. But even though barbequed francolins were my delight, I could not monopolize the dish if I was to follow the Turkana way, and had to share them with my friends. On the day I learned of the category of possessions called *ngibaren a akib*, I believed that one could "do as one pleases" to things in this category. So I cried out at supper that day, "These francolins are my *akib*, and I am eating them all by myself!"

My Turkana friends first looked perplexed, but then a young man said, "Ohta, your *akib* are your cash, tobacco, and the local brew kept in your hut. You don't need to tell us when you wish to give them away. But food is not *akib*. The *akib* livestock is also called *ngibaren a alakara* (livestock of joy). This is because they are to be given away for the other people's enjoyment. If you are not sharing the francolins with us, whom do you have in mind to give them?" The young man then added, "I don't have *akib* livestock, because I am not married. Are you married?"

*Akib* is contrasted with *awi*, the family. The Turkana logic is that only a married man with his own family (*awi*) possesses *akib* livestock as well. Another time, the villagers explained to me that the category of *akib* livestock distinguished the husband's livestock from the wife's. That is, *akib* livestock are all goats and sheep that the husband acquired from the outside world as gifts and bridewealth, excluding the livestock that the wife acquired herself as bridewealth and gifts.

The husband may seem to have more discretion over livestock than the wives. But as Case 3 shows, the husband must be always on guard that the wives may resist his discretion, because in reality, all livestock belong to wives. Even with *akib* livestock, a wife has entitlements. The episode below illustrates this point clearly.

Case 5 (15 June 1991)

A man in his late 50s had two wives. He had a daughter between him and his first wife, who was soon marrying, and bridewealth negotiations had just started with the groom's kin on how much livestock was to be transferred. He and his two wives each would get his/her own share of bridewealth, and he should allocate his own share to his wives. So how would he distribute the livestock to his two wives? One young man who was a neighbour of the bride's family explained to me what he thought would happen:

"The father of the bride will probably allocate more animals to the second wife than the first wife. The first wife has a son about thirty years of age and fully grown. If the father distributes many animals to the first wife, not only she will have entitlements to the livestock, but her son as well. The mother's livestock are at the same time the son's. The son will multiply the livestock originally kept by the mother. When the bride's father wants to utilize the livestock of his first wife, whether giving them away to his friends or selling them, the son of the first wife will variously refute the decisions. When the son is fully grown, he can argue strongly against his father, and the interests of father and son will not always match. No father likes such conflict. Therefore, the father will try to allocate many animals to the second wife who is still young, in order to exert stronger discretionary power when he wishes to utilize the animals. If the first wife complains about the allocation, he can point out that she has already gained many animals as her own share of bridewealth."

The young man who explained this to me used the expression *ngibaren a akib* for the livestock that the bride's father is to acquire as his share of bridewealth. But it was clear that the father could not have any monopolistic entitlement to the newly gained animals. It was also true that even if this father avoided conflict with the first wife and her son by allocating much livestock to the second wife, the second wife will argue for her own entitlements once the livestock is allocated to her. This is natural, since the second wife must care for the new animals, milking them, giving them water, and keeping them healthy.



### III. Negotiating Livestock Entitlement Utilizing the “Piece-in-Hand”

The husband may be able to defend his discretion over dispensing with *akib* livestock. However, the livestock of this category does not fall under his complete discretion as an absolute rule that everybody acquiesces to. The husband is surrounded by people who may claim entitlements to his *akib* livestock at any time. Nor can the wife dispose of her livestock freely even if they were gained as bridewealth or gift to her. The extent of one's entitlement cannot be generalized by statuses such as being a husband and being a wife. No specific livestock comes with a fixed entitlement where one can say, “Because I acquired the livestock through such and such a history, I have A, B, and C entitlements.”

The Turkana make the livestock all “belong” to specific persons by applying the category of *akib* livestock and “allocating” animals to wives in a family. However, when the livestock has to be dispensed for a specific purpose, each person must stand up face-to-face against the refusal of others to acquiesce to a transaction, and argue for one's own legitimacy. There is no knowing the outcome of the standoff, so therefore, entitlements to livestock are always situational and in flux.

Such circumstances are basically the same even outside the family. For example, young Lopur had to slaughter many goats to appease the neighbourhood men and the kin of his lover who demanded to eat “his” goats. The demand was deemed to have certain legitimacy, and this was why Lopur offered his goats. Also, Lopur himself had been given livestock from kin and friends. Such gift giving took place because people recognized that Lopur had his entitlements. However, among the Turkana, persons who demand to eat or be given animals must first argue for his/her legitimacy, and the persons who are made such demands will only be able to refuse the demand by cleverly arguing and persuading otherwise. This negotiation is not at all different from those that occur within a family.

The Turkana are faced with constant negotiations, and they all persuade the other as to their legitimate entitlement. Let's call a “piece-in-hand” the logic and explanation that people use for this purpose. For example, when a boy's entitlement was not respected, the boy may use this incident as his “piece-in-hand” next time, saying that he deferred last time. Lopur in Case 1 brought up a past episode that his mother slaughtered his identified animal without first telling him, to which his mother retorted by bringing up yet another past incident of her nanny goat dying because of Lopur. Likewise, if a husband gave away one of his livestock to his friend against his wife's wishes, the wife will use the incident as her “piece-in-hand” in her next negotiation. This is the Turkana way of how the outcome of one negotiation will become the “piece-in-hand” tool for the next negotiation. The chain of negotiations continues forever.

In Turkana society, norms truly exist, and it is possible for them to utilize the norms shown above as Turkana Statements to buttress the legitimacy of their arguments. The important point is that the norms and rules of the Turkana are neither absolute nor omnipotent in persuading the other. Kitamura (1991: 146) who stud-

ied the same Turkana society wrote that the Turkana in their social interactions do not “refer to certain absolute standards,” nor “make agreements utilizing them as the basis.” This is true for entitlement negotiations over livestock. In Turkana, norms and rules are presented according to situations, as “piece-in-hand” for the specific negotiation, but never applied universally to all situations. In this sense, when the Turkana refer to the norms and rules, it is on a level with arguing an individual fact, such as, “I deferred to you in the past,” or, “I have only one goat so I cannot give it to you.”

Generally speaking, to say “such and such happened some time ago,” can be a statement of a fact to everybody, and rules and norms, “in such and such situation one should do A, B, and C,” may be applied to all parties involved. However, when the Turkana negotiate entitlements pertaining to livestock, such facts and norms do not apply unconditionally. They use various norms (cf. above Turkana Statements) and facts as their “piece-in-hand,” combine them freely to take control of the negotiation and persuade the other. They repeatedly redefine the issue at hand and how they will be judged. This is the process that the interested parties of the negotiation each create “the truth” of a specific time frame to make the other recognize one’s legitimacy.<sup>(3)</sup>

When the Turkana negotiate over his/her entitlement to a specific livestock, the situation is always unique. This is one and the same with the Turkana attitude that they never trust general and universal rules at any time. Each Turkana possesses a multitude of his/her own historical processes leading up to the specific time frame of the negotiation.

## RECONSTRUCTION OF LIVESTOCK ENTITLEMENT

### I. Inconsistency in Livestock Ownership

I have been truly struck by how the Turkana have keen and minute memories of every single incident that occurred to their livestock. For example, I identified in my research all the individuals of livestock held by several families, dividing them into matrilineal pedigrees. After many years, the villagers remembered in detail the pedigrees and current events of the livestock I had recorded. The Turkana use livestock for exchange and as gifts as the medium for creating and maintaining social relations. There exist specific animals at each and every turning point of social relations, and livestock transfers remain in people’s memory. Only when the livestock that go through transfer are remembered as specific and existing individuals, does history become explicit and established. I am always struck by how much the Turkana remember in detail.

Here I will present an example of how the Turkana go back in time to examine the pedigrees of their livestock, and reconstruct ownership. First one needs to be familiarized with the following two Turkana Statements.

## [Turkana Statement 6]

The livestock gained through exchanging animal-X belongs to the person who owned X.

## [Turkana Statement 7]

The offspring of a female animal belongs to the owner of the mater animal. In other words, the owner of livestock belonging to a matrilineal pedigree is the one and same person unless there is a special exchange or gift giving.

Nanam and Mogira were half-brothers. Their parents had passed away, and Nanam was older, about 40 years of age in 1990, and was the first wife's eldest son. Mogira was the eldest son of the second wife. Because each of these brothers inherited livestock from their own mothers, they held their own livestock separately. But they continued to live together, and I researched livestock of this family. Along the way, I encountered cases where the above Turkana Statement 6 could not apply.

## Case 6 (15 June 1991)

The brothers gave four heads of goat and sheep to the brother of Nanam's mother around 1990. For this, they received a heifer. In 1988, two (X and Y) of the four livestock the brothers gave away had been kept by Nanam, and two (Z) by Mogira (Table 1, 1988). If such was the case, to whom did the newly acquired heifer belong? Would the brothers "co-own" the animal?

**Table 1.** Inconsistency in claimed livestock ownership between Brothers Nanam and Mogira in 1988 and 1991.

Livestock	Ownership		Explanation for why the owner seemingly switched
	1988	1991	
X: one castrated goat	Nanam	Mogira	Mogira "identified" with X
Y: one nulliparous sheep	Nanam	Mogira	Originally belonged to Mogira
Z: two castrated sheep	Mogira	Mogira	

Nanam and Mogira gained a heifer in exchange for X, Y and Z.

Their explanation in 1991 to my question was seemingly clear-cut (Table 1). They said that all four goats and sheep given away for the exchange belonged to Mogira, so it followed that the heifer was Mogira's as well. The castrated goat-X in Table 1 was originally Nanam's. It was given to Mogira, because of his identification. Indeed, X had Mogira's coat color. I must have missed hearing of this transfer in my 1988 research.

The case of the nulliparous sheep-Y in Table 1 needed a more detailed explanation. The founder of the pedigree to which Y belonged to was gained in exchange for a castrated goat-V. The owner of the pedigree to which this goat-V belonged to was Mogira, but the goat-V itself was given to Nanam because it had Nanam's coat color and he identified with it. However, when goat-V was exchanged with a female sheep, the founder of Y's pedigree, this sheep belonged to Mogira,

because goat-V was originally owned by Mogira. Therefore sheep-Y also belonged to Mogira, according to the brothers' explanation.

## II. Gift and Lease of Livestock

The above case where a castrated goat-V was given to the elder brother by a younger brother due to identification may also be understood in light of the following Turkana Statement.

[Turkana Statement 8]

There are two Turkana words for the verb, "to give (away)."

(A) *Ainakin*: "to give (away)" in general, which can also denote "to lend."

(B) *Amekin*: "to give away livestock."

The people differentiate the two verbs as follows. Broadly speaking, each female livestock's milk is a family member's entitlement within a Turkana family. If female animals of one person no longer produces milk whereas someone else has many females that do, the former who needs milk may ask the latter for a lactating animal. If the family member who is asking for a lactating animal uses verb (A), it means that the livestock transfer is temporary. If the request is made with the other verb (B), the livestock transfer denotes ownership transfer as well.

In simplified definitions, the use of verb (A) involves a usufruct right, while the use of verb (B) involves the ownership itself. The Turkana vocabulary lacks the verbs, to lend and borrow, but in the following passage, I shall use the word, lend, to denote the concession of usufruct right.

Another situation that is similar to lending livestock occurs with an identification of a special partner animal. For example, when I purchased a billy goat, a Turkana man approached me and said, "This animal has my coat color. Will you give it to me?" My young research assistant who overheard this warned me that, "The man used the verb, *amekin* (B), not *ainakin* (A), so if you consent, you will lose your goat." This succinctly shows how the two verbs are differentiated by the Turkana, i.e. one can lend (= *ainakin*) livestock due to another's identification, and not completely give it away. Then the seeming inconsistency in Table 1 resolves, because when Nanam identified with Mogira's castrated goat-V, Mogira lent him the goat. This is probably why the female sheep, the founder of sheep-Y's pedigree, gained through a subsequent exchange became Mogira's.

However, there are still some unexplained points to this interpretation. First, if Nanam's identified goat-V was lent from Mogira, and the female sheep gained in a subsequent exchange also belonged to Mogira, why did Mogira tell me in 1988 that sheep-Y's entire pedigree belonged to Nanam? What the brothers told me was inconsistent.

When I compared my research notes on livestock ownership by the brothers from 1988 and 1991, the claimed owners of four sheep pedigrees including that of sheep-Y had switched (Table 2). Each of the founder sheep of these four pedigrees was gained by an exchange with a he-goat. All four he-goats were orig-

inally owned by Mogira, but all had been given to Nanam due to identification. In 1988, two pedigrees of sheep (A and B in Table 2) belonged to Nanam, and the remaining two pedigrees (C and D in Table 2) belonged to Mogira. If the Turkana Statement 8 applied, the he-goat used to gain sheep that mothered pedigree C and D must have been only lent to Nanam. But in 1991, the ownerships had switched, and Nanam owned pedigrees C and D, while Mogira owned pedigrees A and B. Had the brothers strictly followed Turkana Statement 8 distinguishing *ainakin* (to lend) from *amekin* (to transfer ownership), this could not have happened.

**Table 2.** Reconstruction of sheep ownership between Brothers Nanam and Mogira.

Pedigree of sheep	Owner of sheep's pedigrees in two research periods	
	1988	1991
A, B	Nanam	Mogira
C, D	Mogira	Nanam

A, B, C, and D are different pedigrees of sheep.

### III. Improvisation for Reconstructing Livestock Ownership: Nanam's Marriage

The key to this conundrum lies in the fact that Nanam married his first wife around May of 1989. In Turkana society, much livestock ownership switches in becoming bridewealth. For Nanam's marriage, ten cattle, five camels, five donkeys, and 188 head of goats and sheep were transferred to the bride's family. In the accompanying rituals, just over a dozen goats and sheep were slaughtered, so that the brothers lost more than a total of 200 head of goats and sheep for the occasion. The animals accounted for about two thirds of goats and sheep owned by the brothers. Mogira who was single at that time contributed the half.

The number of livestock to be transferred as bridewealth is decided over many days of negotiations between the two groups in a marriage. The father of the bride would demand much livestock, while the family of the groom does the best to decrease the number. At the same time, the groom's family members discuss the logistics of rounding up the necessary head of livestock (Ohta 2007). I could not be present when the brothers Nanam and Mogira discussed Nanam's bridewealth, but the negotiation in choosing each head of livestock must have been a difficult task.

Since the Turkana have minute memory of the pedigrees of all the livestock they own, the brothers must have recounted every detail in choosing livestock for bridewealth. I assume that the brothers reconstructed some pedigrees' ownership in the process, resulting in the inconsistent conundrum in Table 2. In fact, Mogira told me the undermentioned in 1991 about the pedigree-C of sheep in Table 2, which had been reported as his in 1988. He said that, "The founder sheep was originally gained in the exchange using a he-goat that used to belong to me, but Nanam had identified as his partner animal. This being so, when he married, I

gave all the sheep of pedigree-C to Nanam that reproduced from the founder sheep which had been once returned to me.”

In close inspection, before Nanam's marriage, Mogira had slaughtered one sheep for his own ailment-curing ritual from the pedigree-C that he said in 1991 he had given to his brother at his wedding. This pedigree was clearly his up to the time of Nanam's wedding. To recapitulate, in helping Nanam prepare enough livestock for his wedding, Mogira gave up an entire pedigree descended from the returned animal.

Paying bridewealth is fraught with risks because the amount of livestock one owns dramatically decreases. The brothers Nanam and Mogira would have improvised livestock ownership against this potentially disastrous situation. All the founder sheep of the pedigrees in Table 2 were gained by exchanges with he-goats originally belonging to Mogira, but were given to Nanam as partner animals of identification. In transferring the ownership of sheep pedigrees in Table 2, the fact that the he-goats that Nanam identified with originally belonged to Mogira was given priority to reconstruct the pedigrees of A and B. Conversely, in case of pedigrees C and D, the fact that Nanam identified with his partner he-goats was given priority, and these pedigrees were transferred to Nanam. Had the brothers applied Turkana Statement 8 strictly, this improvisation was not possible. This illustrates how the Turkana may go back in history to “correctly” dispense with the livestock.

## CONCLUSION

I have described how the Turkana create and reconstruct facts for themselves and try to persuade the others of their own legitimacy, which is their style of negotiation. But it does not follow that they are utilitarians who only pursue egoistic interests. The Turkana try hard to reach agreements on specific matters, and for them to accomplish this, negotiation is paramount. The brothers Nanam and Mogira did not simply protect each other's interest by exchanging four pedigrees of sheep. What they achieved through the process of reconstructing livestock ownership was to redefine their mutual social relationship. This was of their utmost interest, and they were ultimately successful.

However, social relationships may fray in the face of crisis situations. I have seen some cases where emotional discord swelled among family members, to the point that the family eventually dissolved. One such dissolution of the family was directly because two female family members demanded to be the legitimate owner of a pedigree of goats that had come to the family more than ten years before. There were many discussions as to the original animal and pedigree, and much negotiations ensued. The Turkana people remember the minute and detailed history of each and every livestock. However, facts and perceptions do not always match among the concerned people. In this family's case, the interested parties mobilized and referred to various rules and facts that were true, and no party yielded.

In the East African pastoralist societies, livestock are owned by individuals, but in reality, numerous people have numerous entitlements to each of the livestock. This has been already pointed out by many anthropologists. Baxter (1975: 212) wrote that each livestock animal bore "a bundle of rights," and Gulliver (1951: 89), who studied the same Turkana society as I, pointed out that in order to understand Turkana property relations, livestock ownership must be understood as "a cluster of rights" of various levels and various types.

However useful the above analytical tools may seem, to apply them to understand the Turkana leads us to believe that a cluster or bundle of rights exists as a real entity. But clarifying the categories of individuals and the kinds of entitlements that they hold, will not help to fully understand the property relations of livestock. There is more risk in missing the reality of how dynamic the Turkana livestock ownership and entitlements are in daily life.

When the Turkana people deal with entitlement issues, they are relentless in the negotiation. The interested parties all have backgrounds of similar negotiations in the past. They are never shy to go head-to-head as individuals fully loaded with demands. For the Turkana, these negotiations about livestock entitlement always are expressed as specific and unique cases. Rules and facts are readily offered as "pieces-in-hand" in the negotiations to defend one's own legitimacy, but they carefully choose their "piece-in-hand," and never use them all at once. The choice will be decided by the mutual interactions of parties that are in negotiation. Through this process, some sort of conclusion will be meted out, but the outcome is always unpredictable to the persons concerned. In other words, "a cluster or bundle of rights" does not exist. It only becomes a reality as it emerges performatively in the process of negotiation that the Turkana repeatedly engage in regarding livestock.

Giddens (1976) criticized the view of Durkheim and Parsons who asserted that social norms were external to the individuals. He opposed the argument that attributed the individual's subjective actions to their "internalization of values," and claimed, rather, that human actions actively constructed social life. In negotiating livestock entitlements, the Turkana may refer to various norms and rules. However, these rules are not to be applied mechanically. Just as facts may not be the same to everybody, the rules are always reinterpreted and put to practice. In this sense, the rules and norms do not restrict the individuals as an external factor.

In the beginning of this article, I wrote of a "helpless ambiguity" in the negotiations of things with the Turkana villagers, as if I did not know if things really belonged to anybody. Such a feeling of ambiguity must have arisen from my naiveté, in that I sought to find a mode of action that is replicable and standardized, faced with the constant Turkana give-and-take of things. Much energy is required in settling individual issues in all kinds of individual negotiations. I probably had wanted to be liberated from the burden of constant, individual negotiations, and had wanted to set up for myself a standardized pattern of action. And to be forced into such a standardized pattern of action is what the Turkana people most loathe.



## NOTES

- (1) Austin (1962) argued that any human statement was an “action,” and termed it “performative utterance.” He also examined the fact that an utterance had “illocutionary forces.” However, I use the term, “performatively,” to emphasize that the specific “bundle of rights” emerges only in a process of specific interactions at a specific time and place, so that this “bundle of rights” is temporal, and the Turkana do not much trust it. For further reference, see Bourdieu’s argument of theory of practice (Bourdieu, 1990) and Butler’s theory of performativity (Butler, 1990).
- (2) The etymology of *akib* is unknown.
- (3) Storas (1991) recorded very interesting cases of livestock negotiations of the Turkana.

**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS** This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP19K12502, JP18H03606, JP16H06318, and JP16K01978. Research in Kenya was conducted under government license Numbers NACOSTI/P/18/85073/24380 and NACOSTI/P/19/163. Professor Kennedy Mkutu of United States International University in Nairobi assisted me in various phases of this research. Staff of JSPS Nairobi Research Station, Daisuke Mizoguchi and Nobu Inazumi just to name a few, extended invaluable assistance. Anonymous reviewers of ASM offered suggestive comments. To these people and institutions, I make grateful acknowledgment.

## REFERENCES

- Austin, J.L. 1962. *How to Do Things with Words*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Baxter, P.T.W. 1975. Some consequences of sedentarization for social relationships. In (T. Monod, ed.) *Pastoralism in Tropical Africa*, pp. 206–228. Oxford University Press, London.
- Beidelman, T. O. 1966. The ox and Nuer sacrifice: Some Freudian hypotheses about Nuer symbolism. *Man (NS)*, 1(4): 453–467.
- Benda-Beckmann, F. von, K. von Benda-Beckmann & M.G. Wiber 2006. The properties of property. In (F. von Benda-Beckmann, K. von Benda-Beckmann & M.G. Wiber, eds.) *Changing Properties of Property*, pp. 1–39. Berghahn Books, Oxford.
- Bourdieu, P. 1990. *The Logic of Practice*. Stanford University Press, Redwood.
- Butler, J.P. 1990. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. Routledge, New York.
- Comaroff, J.L. & S. Roberts 1981. *Rules and Processes*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Dahl, G. 1987. Women in pastoral production: Some theoretical notes on roles and resources. *Ethnos*, 52: 246–279.
- Dioli, M. 2018. Nomad aesthetic: Cattle modifications among the northern Turkana of north west Kenya. *Pastoralism: Reseach, Policy and Prattice*, 8: 6. DOI 10.1186/s13570-017-0110-4.
- Giddens, A. 1976. *New Rules of Sociological Method*. Routledge, London.
- Gluckman, M. 1965a. *The Ideas in Barotse Jurisprudence*. Manchester University Press, Manchester.
- 1965b. *Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society*. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

- Gulliver, P.H. 1951. *A Preliminary Survey of the Turkana*. Cape Town University, Cape Town.
- 1955. *The Family Herds*. Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, London.
- Itani, J. 1982. *The Great Drought: The Turkana Diary* (in Japanese). Shinchosha, Tokyo.
- Khazanov, A.M. & G. Schlee 2012. Introduction. In (A.M. Khazanov & G. Schlee, eds.) *Who Owns the Stock? Collective and Multiple Property Rights in Animals*, pp. 1–23. Berghahn Books, New York.
- Kitamura, K. 1991. The society that demands a “deep involvement.” In (J. Tanaka & M. Takeya, eds.) *Natural History of Humanity* (in Japanese), pp. 137–164. Heibonsha, Tokyo.
- Ohta, I. 1986. Reciprocity among the Turkana. In (J. Itani & J. Tanaka, eds.) *The Anthropology of Nature Society: To Live in Africa* (in Japanese), pp. 181–215. Academia Shuppankai, Kyoto.
- 1987. Livestock individual identification among the Turkana: The animal classification and naming in the pastoral livestock management. *African Study Monographs*, 8(1): 1–69.
- 2001. Motivations, negotiations, and animal individuality: Livestock exchange of the Turkana in northwestern Kenya. *Nilo-Ethiopian Studies*, 7: 45–61.
- 2007. Marriage and bridewealth negotiations among the Turkana in northwestern Kenya. *African Study Monographs Supplementary Issue*, 37: 3–26.
- Pelican, M. 2012. From cultural property to market goods: Changes in the economic strategies and herd management rationales of agro-pastoral Fulbe in north west Cameroon. In (A.M. Khazanov & G. Schlee, eds.) *Who Owns the Stock? Collective and Multiple Property Rights in Animals*, pp. 213–230. Berghahn Books, New York.
- Schlee, G. 2012. Multiple rights in animals: An East African overview. In (A.M. Khazanov & G. Schlee, eds.) *Who Owns the Stock? Collective and Multiple Property Rights in Animals*, pp. 247–294. Berghahn Books, New York.
- Spencer, P. 1973. *Nomads in Alliance: Symbiosis and Growth among the Rendille and Samburu of Kenya*. Oxford University Press, London.
- Storas, F. 1991. Cattle complex or begging complex: Livestock transaction and the construction of Turkana society. In (R. Gronhaug, G. Haaland & G. Henriksen, eds.) *The Ecology of Choice and Symbol*, pp. 50–65. Alma Mater Forlag, Bergen.

——— Accepted June 1, 2019

Author's Name and Address: Itaru OHTA, *The Center for African Area Studies, Kyoto University, 46 Yoshida-Shimoadachi-cho, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501, JAPAN.*

E-mail: ohta [at] jambo.africa.kyoto-u.ac.jp